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I. INTRODUCTION
Although I was invited primarily to comment on Professor Dale
Nance’s contribution to this Symposium, Reliability and the
1
Admissibility of Experts, I hope my comments will have relevance
beyond the four corners of his article. Without question, his article is
a laudable piece of evidence scholarship. Indeed, that is its main
defect. But Professor Nance is far from alone, for this failing is
shared by much of the legal scholarship and judicial authority in this
area. Briefly put, Professor Nance deals with the subject of expert
evidence mainly the way traditional evidence scholars have
approached this subject from time immemorial. But expert evidence
is not like other kinds of evidence. While it shares many superficial
features with ordinary evidence, it is nothing like such mainstays of
evidence doctrine as hearsay or character. This bare resemblance has
2
led many astray. Scientific evidence—and after Kumho Tire all expert
3
testimony—requires courts to make science policy. This is not
∗
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In this Essay, I use the terms “expert evidence” and “scientific evidence”
interchangeably. In evidentiary terms, this is entirely appropriate since Rule 702
applies to all expert testimony, not just scientific evidence. Moreover, in Kumho Tire,
Justice Breyer made clear that courts should expect no bright line dividing the
scientific from the nonscientific. Yet many courts and commentators continue to
speak as if some line exists separating the two. Even Professor Nance is partly guilty
of seeing the world in this way. See Nance, supra note 1, at 202. But, as I have argued
elsewhere,
Science does not “exist” categorically or in some concrete encyclopedia
of knowledge that passes muster by, say, some committee of the
National Academies of Science. Science is a process or method by
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optional; it is part of the intrinsic nature of the subject. The
admissibility decision necessarily requires a policy judgment, and any
treatment of the subject that fails to appreciate and incorporate that
fact is missing an essential dimension of the problem.
4
In Flatland: A Romance of Many Dimensions, a classic mathematical
and satirical novel first published in 1884, Edwin A. Abbott explored
what the world would look like to creatures that live in twodimensional space, having only length and width. In Abbott’s
flatland, geometric creatures inhabit a world that consists of an
infinite plane. According to Euclid, a point has zero dimensions, a
line one, a plane two, and a solid three. Abbott was actually
interested in the provocative notion that we live in a universe with
four (or more) dimensions—a notion with much modern currency
given contemporary theories in physics.
But imagining four
dimensions is quite difficult, so Abbott constructed a world with only
two and described how that world would perceive creatures or objects
from a three-dimensional world, a world he called “spaceland.”
Appropriately, for present purposes, the story is narrated by a
conservative lawyer named A. Square. Other flatlanders appear as
straight lines, and only by feeling their fellow creatures can they
determine how many sides other flatlanders have. In the rigidly
hierarchical society of flatland, in which the number of sides one has
designates social class, the upper classes consider this feeling about
rather gauche.
When a three-dimensional creature enters flatland, it appears to
which factual statements or predictions about the world are devised,
tested, evaluated, revised, replaced, rejected, or accepted . . . Courts
make a fundamental error when they try to divide the world into
science and specialty categories. In truth, every expert who appears in
court has “specialized” knowledge of one sort or another. At best, it is
specialized knowledge based upon good applied science; at worst, it is
specialized knowledge based upon “years of personal experience.”
David L. Faigman, Is Science Different for Lawyers, 297 SCIENCE 339, 340 (2002)
[hereinafter Is Science Different]. Therefore, both as a practical matter and under the
Rules of Evidence, it is inappropriate to distinguish between scientific and
specialized testimony. Rule 702 thus would be clearer if it simply applied to all
specialized knowledge that “will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue.” FED. R. EVID. 702. The issue presented by this
Symposium—what standards should be applied post-Kumho Tire—also would be more
plainly presented, since courts would be obligated to consider explicitly how well
supported proffered, specialized knowledge must be before gaining admission,
whether based on sound scientific methods, personal observation, or some level in
between.
4
EDWIN A. ABBOT, FLATLAND: A ROMANCE OF MANY DIMENSIONS (1884); see EDWIN
A. ABBOT, THE ANNOTATED FLATLAND: A ROMANCE OF MANY DIMENSIONS (Introduction
and notes by Ian Stewart) (2002).
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hover in space, expanding and retracting in dimension as it moves
across the flatlanders plane of vision. It would be as if the flatlander
could perceive the world only from the surface of a pond. A
flatlander would not be able to see below the surface of the water or
above it. If a beach ball broke the surface, it would first appear as a
dot, progressively expanding to its full diameter—though seen as a
straight line—and then decreasing in size to a dot before
disappearing entirely.
Professor Nance’s evidentiary world operates similarly in two
dimensions. His flatland cannot account for the three dimensional
space in which science operates. Professor Nance’s world also lacks
depth. It is the depth of the scientific enterprise. Nance’s flatlanders
cannot see science before it emerges on the horizon of the
courtroom or after it moves beyond that horizon. An evidentiary
flatlander sees scientific research programs as straight lines, and the
standard for assessing admissibility amounts to little more than
comparing their sizes. Flatlanders have no perception of past
scientific processes and no conception of future potential. Their
world lacks scientific culture. Science seems to float abstractly along
the flatlanders’ horizon, unconnected to space or time.
Abbott’s flatlanders live in the same universe as spacelanders
(i.e., us), so many of the descriptions of reality naturally resonate for
Abbott’s three dimensional readers. The same is true for Professor
Nance’s discussion of expert testimony in evidence flatland. In
particular, Professor Nance’s two main theses have value in evidence
spaceland. The first is his belief that reliability is not a dichotomous
variable. Despite the fact that he believes that my coauthors and I
(hereinafter referred to as Faigman et al., with my apologies to my
coauthors, David Kaye, Michael Saks, and Joseph Sanders) erected
5
just this sort of dichotomy, through our recognition that Daubert
6
requires a “threshold of reliability,” no one truly believes that
reliability is a dichotomous variable. The admissibility decision is, of
course, categorical, but reliability and validity provide no such simple
dichotomy. The first section of this Essay briefly addresses Professor
Nance’s imputation that Faigman et al. sought to make reliability
dichotomous by mandating a minimum threshold requirement for
scientific evidence.
The second major theme of Professor Nance’s article is his
embrace of what Faigman et al. called the “better evidence principle.”
5

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
David L. Faigman et al., How Good Is Good Enough?: Expert Evidence Under
Daubert and Kumho, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 645 (2000).
6
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Here, he finds much to like in our approach, although his is both
rather more limited and somewhat broader than what we
contemplated. It is this thesis that loses depth when described from
Professor Nance’s flatlander perspective. The Nance better evidence
rule, unlike Faigman et al.’s, is driven almost entirely—albeit not
completely—by evidentiary concerns. Faigman et al. were driven by
different considerations. It was our contention that the evidentiary
determination regarding expert evidence must take into account—it
must integrate into its foundational premises—the culture of the
scientific method. Whereas Professor Nance sees expert evidence as
another species of evidence law, not unlike hearsay or character
evidence, Faigman et al. saw it as a different animal altogether.
II. RELIABILITY AS A CONTINUOUS VARIABLE
Professor Nance laments, “Unfortunately, prominent scholars . .
. often agree, explicitly or implicitly, on the idea that the post-Daubert
regime rightly requires expertise to exceed . . . a threshold of
7
reliability.” He cites Professor Imwinkelried and Faigman et al. as
examples.
Professor Imwinkelried, in this Symposium,
unambiguously states that he does not see evidentiary reliability in
8
dichotomous terms.
Faigman et al. also hereby disclaim any
intention to transform reliability into a dichotomous variable by our
statement that Daubert requires “a minimal threshold of reliability.”
All we meant was that, unlike Frye, in which expert evidence might be
admitted after it has gained the confidence of a well-meaning guild—
with no empirical testing at all—Daubert requires some minimal
amount of testing. Although not all courts have implemented Daubert
in this way, we argued that Daubert requires the production of some
data that are the product of some reasonably reliable methods that
have produced some results that can be generalized to the case in
which they are offered. This is the minimum and this is what the
Daubert regime demands. Our point, then, was similar to Chief
9
Justice Rehnquist’s admonition in Joiner that courts cannot rely
merely on the ipse dixit of testifying experts that their conclusions are
reliable.
Professor Nance is also incorrect in supposing that by advocating
a minimal threshold we sought to “transform continuous variation
7

Nance, supra note 1, at 220-21.
Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Relativity of Reliability, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 269,
270 (2003) (“I agree with Professor Nance’s thesis that reliability should be
conceived in relative terms.”).
9
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
8
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into dichotomous choice.” It is commonplace for continuous scales
to have thresholds that create “dichotomies.” Thirty-two degrees
Fahrenheit is the threshold for water turning to ice on the
continuous scale of temperature. I would imagine that even
Professor Nance would grant that expert evidence regarding a
prediction of future behavior (say, future violence) that relies on
“scientific” measuring devices such as tarot cards, tea leaves, and
crystal balls, falls below “a minimal threshold of reliability” under
Daubert.
I do agree that in regards to methods more sophisticated than
crystal balls or casual observation, the reliability criterion should be
relative. Indeed, this is the whole point. Unlike Professor Nance,
however, I would not approach this issue as merely an evidentiary
matter. This needs to be understood as a matter of science policy.
III. EXPERT EVIDENCE IS DIFFERENT
A. The Nature of Expert Evidence
The principal difference between expert testimony and other
sorts of testimony to which the Federal Rules apply is that in virtually
all cases a large aspect of the evidence transcends the particular
dispute in which it is offered. In the terminology of Kenneth Culp
Davis, hearsay and character evidence are paradigmatic examples of
10
adjudicative facts. They are particular to the dispute and their verity
and value can largely be assessed through the lens of the particular
case. The same is not true for expert evidence. Whether implicit or
explicit, almost all expert opinion depends on considerations that
transcend particular cases—or, at least, it ought to.
The essence of expert opinion is that it is the process of both
inductive and deductive reasoning. Whether a defendant suffers
from the battered woman syndrome or a tire failed because of
“overdeflection,” the essence of the expert’s testimony is that this case
is like other similarly situated cases in the world beyond the particular
courtroom. Similarly, accountants and realtors believe that their
conclusions follow from experience with the world beyond the
courtroom. The specific case is in some way representative of some
general phenomenon.
Obviously, ordinary testimony also concerns experiences beyond
the courtroom. A witness who states that the light was red when the
10

See Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative
Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402-03 (1942).

260

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

Vol. 34:255

plaintiff’s car went through the intersection or that the bloody knife
was found in the defendant’s garage, is testifying to facts that
occurred outside of the courtroom. But the testimony pertains to
single incidents, and, beyond the circumstances under which they
were observed, neither the witness nor the fact finder needs to infer
anything about the nature of the world more generally. Consider, for
example, the difference between a police officer’s testimony that he
discovered drugs in the possession of the defendant and his proposed
testimony that the defendant intended to sell those drugs. As an
ordinary fact witness, the officer might say that he found two pounds
of marijuana wrapped in plastic and stashed in the defendant’s toilettank. In addition, the officer might testify that he found a scale for
weighing small quantities in the defendant’s bedroom and baggies in
the kitchen. The officer, however, might seek to testify further—now
as an expert—that in his experience defendants possessing two or
more pounds of marijuana, together with scales to weigh the drugs
and baggies to package them, usually possess the drugs with the
intent to sell them. Although courts routinely allow this sort of socalled experiential testimony, the officer is no longer a simple fact
witness. The witness, like all experts, is saying that this defendant
shares certain general characteristics that are associated with drug
11
dealing, as opposed to simple possession for personal use.
Professor Nance offers the example of realtors who propose to
testify on the value of certain property. One party offers an expert
who has taken an ostensibly scientific approach to the subject by
surveying comparable property in the vicinity. The opponent
challenges this evidence and offers its own expert, one who used a
“gestalt assessment,” which is more ordinarily described as “years of
experience.” Professor Nance’s answer to the question whether one,
both, or neither of the experts gets to testify is instructive. His focus
is exclusively on the courtroom use of the evidence, and he admirably
crunches the various considerations that might be presented in that
limited forum. He never mentions, or suggests as relevant, what sorts
of empirical methods should be expected to be brought to bear in
answering the empirical question regarding the value of property.
Professor Nance analyzes such issues as the burden of proof, the
judge’s role as “representative” of the jury, jury credulity, and so
forth. The key component and conclusion of his analysis seems to be
11
As discussed below, the officer’s hypothesis that possessors of two pounds of
marijuana intend to sell rather than simply use the drug is testable by the scientific
method. Whether it should have to be tested is a policy judgment. So far, the courts
have assiduously avoided confronting this question or even recognizing that it must
be answered.
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that the judge should admit “the best evidence that is or should have
been reasonably available, with due regard to the adversarial
12
structure of the trial.” This means that evidence will be excluded
under this theory only if the proponent of the evidence could have
secured better evidence and that the evidence was not reasonably
13
available to the opponent.
Thus, Professor Nance constructs a
scheme whereby the law of evidence would demand the best evidence
that could be brought into the courtroom, and the assessment would
be almost entirely a comparative one between what the proponent
proffered and what other proof the proponent could have
introduced. In effect, then, the admissibility determination is made
from a snapshot, and the court sees only the evidence before it, with
no consideration of what has occurred before or might occur after
the decision. Professor Nance, however, carves an exception to this
static picture for certain kinds of expertise, such as forensic evidence,
since “repeat players, . . . may plausibly be considered in regard to the
long run of cases, rather than based on what is reasonably available in
14
the short enough run to address a particular case.”
The myopic snapshot by which Professor Nance would have trial
courts judge scientific evidence is fundamentally flawed. It fails to
take into account the dynamic nature of empirical inquiry. More
ominously, it also fails to take into account the law’s effect on many of
the disciplines that hawk their wares at the courthouse door. If the
gatekeeper metaphor is to have any meaning, it cannot be limited to
having judges choose between poor alternatives. Where Professor
Nance would have judges ask whether better evidence is available, I
would have them ask whether better evidence should be available.
Judges should operate in three-dimensional space, not two.
Indeed, as noted, Professor Nance advocates this more dynamic
approach for “repeat players, such as the state in regard to forensic
15
science techniques.”
But the exception itself well illustrates the
12

Nance, supra note 1, at 241.
Id..
14
Id. at 249. This strategy seems to serve a possible normative agenda in
Professor Nance’s proposed approach. As he states, his “test will place greater
demands on the prosecution than on the accused in criminal cases, and it will place
greater demands on powerful civil defendants than on impecunious civil plaintiffs.”
Id. at 247.
15
Id. at 249. He does not say whether this exception applies to other “repeat
players,” such as large corporations. If one objective is to put “greater demands on
powerful civil defendants,” then he might impose such a burden.
Unlike
prosecutors, however, it is somewhat less clear that powerful civil defendants have the
burden under Daubert to produce such evidence. Prosecutors are not only repeat
players, they bear the burden of proof as the proponent of the expert evidence.
13
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cramped evidentiary perspective he brings to the subject of expert
evidence. Although litigation may be about “repeat players,” science
is not. Indeed, the whole point of science, as exemplified in the
“peer review” standard of Daubert, is that many unrelated players will
be part of the knowledge production business.
Instead of “repeat players,” courts should attend to repeat
expertise. Consider, for example, the psychological concept of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Plaintiffs and defendants in civil
cases, and prosecutors and defendants in criminal cases, have offered
evidence of this syndrome. Professor Nance would seemingly admit
this evidence so long as it is as good as any other evidence that might
be offered on the relevant issue—except, perhaps, for prosecutors
who might be obligated to demonstrate that better evidence could
not be forthcoming. But this approach completely ignores the law’s
influence on what work gets done. Simply put, if courts demand
better evidence than what has so far been done, then, and often only
then, will that work be done. In the case of PTSD, psychologists are
not conventional parties to the litigation involving their research, yet
they are very interested participants in the process and extremely
sensitive to what courts demand as adequate proof. What Professor
Nance is missing is the fact that science is not a product of any one
litigant or set of litigants. For instance, the fact that a prosecutor in
federal court in Newark has no data to validate handwriting
identification has very little to do with that prosecutor. Indeed, the
last thing the evidence rules should do is encourage the United States
Attorney in Newark to start collecting data. The question is not
whether the Newark prosecutor should be estopped from offering
expert testimony because of a lack of data. The issue is whether the
courts should expect the scientific community (broadly defined) to
have produced better data on handwriting.
Professor Nance correctly states that the admissibility
determination for expert evidence is a relative one. His error is in
limiting the dimensions on which this comparison is done. Professor
Nance appears to fear that an expansion of the inquiry to take into
account the dimensions outside the courtroom will leave courts with
no bearings. Limiting the comparison to the courtroom permits
judges the relatively simple task of measuring length and width.
Perhaps expert evidence that is longest, or perhaps that with the most
number of sides,, can be considered “best.” Measuring depth
complicates the judge’s gatekeeping task enormously. It requires a
reliability assessment of not only what is, but what might be.
Professor Nance complains that this sort of approach is
“vacuous,” for “[i]t merely restates the ‘sufficient reliability’ idea
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without telling us anything affirmative about how to fill it out.”
Professor Nance continues, complaining,
Without giving attention to the parameters in the balance that
determine whether a given degree of reliability is reasonable for
admission, this also effectively requires the judge to answer the
question, “Does the degree of reliability of the expertise
outweigh?” Unless something follows the word “outweigh,” the
17
question is practically incoherent. Outweigh what?

The question is incoherent only because Professor Nance asks it
in the flatland of the individual courtroom. Nance’s concern about
incoherence lies in the limitations of his flatlanders’ spatial
disabilities, not in any inherent incoherence in the three-dimensional
world of scientific evidence. Consider Professor Nance’s real estate
appraiser example. Suppose that a realtor offers to testify on the
basis primarily of his “years of experience,” perhaps buttressed by a
listing of a dozen comparable properties in the area. In Professor
Nance’s world, the judge is reduced to comparing this expert
testimony to what other evidence might be available. To my
knowledge, there is unlikely to be much better evidence available to
the proponent, and thus the evidence will be admitted. In Nance’s
flatland, a realtor with twenty-five years of experience and a list of a
dozen “comp-properties” would be the longest line around.
Adding a third dimension to this analysis changes it completely.
Now the question is, given the nature of the subject and the legal
consequences that follow making a mistake (either of the falsepositive or false-negative variety), how much and what kind of testing
18
should be necessary before it is admitted?
This is hardly an
incoherent question.
There are a multitude of ways that a
scientifically-minded person might validate real estate appraisals.
Appraisers, for instance, routinely assess the value of property before
it goes on sale. Yet, to my knowledge, appraisers do not keep track of
the actual sale price of those houses, much less subject those data to
statistical analysis. Confounds like the amount of time between the
appraisal and sale or changing market conditions could be measured
and analyzed. It does not take great scientific imagination to come
up with many other research paradigms that might be brought to
bear on this issue.
I am not suggesting, however, that real estate appraisers (or
researchers interested in this subject) should have to conduct
16
17
18

Nance, supra note 1, at 222.
Id.
See Is Science Different, supra note 3, at 340.
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original research testing their proficiency at the given task. Whether
such research should be required is a policy question on which I will
remain agnostic. But courts should have to make this policy
judgment, for realtors, for psychologists, for forensic scientists, for
medical doctors, and for any and all expert witnesses.
Undoubtedly, many will complain about the difficulty of the
task. It is true that measuring depth, as well as length and width,
complicates the judge’s job. But so be it. Science is complicated. In
fact, however, most of these determinations are not rocket science
and are well within the grasp of most attorneys. The task of
evaluating realtors in three dimensions, for instance, is hardly
formidable. Much of forensic science and psychology similarly does
not challenge the legal imagination too strenuously. Indeed, the key
stumbling block seems not to be whether the depth of the scientific
enterprise can be understood, but a belief among many that this
dimension is outside the purview of evidence law. The flatlander’s
perspective, according to this view, is mandated by the nature of the
evidence world in which we live, rather than any lack of desire to
escape to spaceland.
B. Scientific Evidence as Science Policy
Two-dimensional perspectives such as Professor Nance’s flatland
tend to concentrate on the adversarial nature of the trial and pay
particular fidelity to the role of juror as trier of fact. Given that the
evidentiary plane is all that there is, this focus is hardly surprising.
But once a third dimension is added, pedestrian concerns about jury
credulity and attorney-control over evidence ought to recede into the
background.
Professor Nance is duly concerned about the juror’s role in the
litigation process. As others have struggled, he seeks to retain a
prominent role for jurors in the evaluation of scientific evidence.
This concern, however, is primarily associated with the belief that
scientific evidence is somehow like ordinary evidence. This leads
Professor Nance into the thicket concerning jury credulity and the
debate whether jurors are any less sophisticated than judges as
consumers of expert testimony. Not surprisingly, he rejects any
notion that they are less sophisticated. Such a view is heresy to
evidence doctrine. He bases his judgment of juror capacities on a
combination of presumption, intuition, and empirical research that
19
itself would never pass muster under Daubert.
His alternative
19

Nance, supra note 1, at 232-33. Evidence scholars and judges are keen to extol
the virtues of jurors. And it would be impolitic for me to suggest otherwise. The
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explanation for the judicial gatekeeping role, again not too
surprisingly a product of the adversarial process, is his belief that
expert evidence is more manipulable than ordinary evidence, and
20
thus requires greater “judicial management.”
The issue of judge versus jury, when considered in three
dimensions rather than two, is largely irrelevant. It is the judge’s task
to evaluate the validity of proffered expert testimony, and that is all
there is to it. There are an assortment of reasons why it is the judge’s
job, some of which will appeal to Nance’s flatlanders and others to
spacelanders. Therefore, the question is not whether judge or jury
should decide preliminary questions of fact (and policy) regarding
the validity of expert evidence. The only question is what is the
nature of the judge’s job in this regard—the rest will be done by the
jury.
The relative nature of the reliability determination is perhaps
the best reason for why the admissibility decision regarding expert
evidence is a policy judgment. Professor Nance and others see the
relativity of science only as manifested in the courtroom. Professor
Imwinkelried, for example, in his response to Professor Nance, finds
“three respects in which the concept [of reliability] is certainly
relative: (1) the specificity of the claim the expert makes; (2) the use
to which the expert’s proponent wants to put the claim; and (3) the
definiteness with which the expert proposes couching his or her
21
ultimate opinion.” But there is an additional dimension inherent in
the scientific enterprise itself. Most importantly, this is the question
of error rates.
Consider the two empirical questions presented in Daubert: Does
Bendectin cause birth defects? And, if so, did Bendectin cause the
plaintiff’s birth defects? The ultimate legal issue is the latter
question, on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof. Here, I
want to focus on the first question, what courts commonly refer to as
“general causation.” In considering proffered research on the
research on the question of judge versus juror, however, remains too scant to be of
much use. Also, logic would suggest that judges’ repeated dealings with at least
certain kinds of expert evidence would give them certain advantages. The
hypothesis, then, is not that judges are smarter or more scientifically literate than
jurors, but that they have more experience with it. Indeed, where judges don’t have
more experience with science, there is reason to believe juries might have an
advantage simply due to having multiple jurors to contemplate the complexities of
the subject. But these are empirical hypotheses that have yet to be studied closely.
As the text makes clear, for me this is largely an academic question, since I believe it
is the judge’s duty to make the admissibility decision as a matter of law.
20
Id. at 232.
21
Imwinkelried, supra note 8, at 269.

266

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

Vol. 34:255

empirical relationship between Bendectin and birth defects, one of
four possibilities are possible: the court could conclude that the basis
for the asserted connection (1) is valid when it is valid (true-positive);
(2) is valid when it is not valid (false-positive or Type 1 Error); (3) is
not valid when it is not valid (true-negative); or (4) is not valid when
it is valid (false-negative or Type 2 Error). The following table
illustrates these four possibilities:
GROUND TRUTH
Valid
Not Valid
Valid
True-Positive
False-Positive
COURT’S
(Type 1 Error)
ADMISSIBILITY
DETERMINATION
Not Valid
False-Negative
True-Negative
(Type 2 Error)
Each of these possibilities ordinarily has a probability figure
attached to it, and these rates are known with more or less
confidence. Here is not the place to explore the details of this point,
for evaluating the nature of these error rates would take more space
than this Comment permits. Suffice it to emphasize that whatever
decision a court makes regarding the admissibility of expert
testimony, it faces the prospect of making one of two kinds of error.
Given a particular amount of research, it is possible to minimize one
kind of error while increasing the likelihood of making the other
kind of error. Thus, in legal terms, it is possible to increase
conviction rates by lowering the standard inherent in the traditional
view that it is better to let ten guilty go free than to convict one
innocent person. But making it easier to convict guilty people means
that more innocent people will be convicted.
Returning to the Bendectin example, a judge’s decision
regarding the admissibility of expert evidence that the drug causes
birth defects might be wrong for one of two reasons. The court could
conclude that Bendectin is, more likely than not, a teratogen when it
is not (false-positive) or that Bendectin is, more likely than not, not a
teratogen when it is (false-negative). The consequences of these two
kinds of error are very different. A false positive means that the
litigation goes forward, possibly resulting in, among other things,
“erroneous” verdicts for plaintiffs, the removal of a beneficial drug
from the market, and bankruptcy for the defendant. A false negative
means that the litigation ends, and, among other things, the
possibilities that plaintiffs injured by the defendant’s drug do not
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receive compensation and a dangerous drug remains available in the
marketplace.
Which type of error, false-positives or false-negatives, is better
avoided is a policy judgment that is an inherent component of expert
evidence. Whether judges want this responsibility or not, it is theirs.
Ignoring it does not make it go away. Professor Nance’s flatland
22
ignores this dimension of the scientific method. In flatland, the
societal consequences of empirical error are not part of the
admissibility decision because Nance’s vision lies only along the
evidentiary plane. It is not that this error somehow disappears or
becomes inconsequential as a result. It is still there, but it lies in a
third dimension that is outside the courtroom. The science policy
choices that are presented by this third dimension are never
consciously made, though they surely have consequences in the
flatland courtroom and in flatland society beyond.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the world of flatland, inhabitants cannot perceive anything
that occurs outside the two dimensions in which they live. From their
vantage point, the third dimension might as well not exist. Certainly,
it cannot be accounted for, and can only be dimly understood.
Professor Nance approaches the subject of expert evidence much as a
flatlander might—in two-dimensional space. In Nance’s flatland,
judges would pay no heed to what occurred before the expertise
reached the courtroom and would ignore what might happen to the
expertise subsequently. More troubling, Nance’s flatland-judges fail
to consider the ramifications of their admissibility decisions both in
regard to the development of the respective expertise and in terms of
the costs of errors—both false positive and false negative—for society
at-large. In the two dimensions of Nance’s flatland, his proposals
admittedly appear sound enough. When his proposals are viewed in
three dimensions, however, they lack depth and substance. Since
courts exist in three dimensional space, where their admissibility
rulings have consequences for the world beyond, standards for expert
testimony should be rendered in three dimensions. Anything less is
flatly inadequate.

22
Professor Nance’s flatland perspective ignores most aspects of the scientific
method outside of the courtroom. In addition to the error rate problem, Professor
Nance ignores the effect the law can have on the development of science, the guild
issues that infect some areas of science, and the evolutionary and dynamic character
of the scientific enterprise.

